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U.S. public anger and desires to avenge the 11 September 2001 terror attacks were redirected 
toward Iraq partly because of its identity as an Arab and Muslim state. Online panel survey data 
reveal that citizens who were relatively angry about the terror attacks were more belligerent 
toward Iraq, and that this effect was strongest among those who perceived Arabs and Muslims in 
monolithic terms.  Angry desires to avenge 9/11 were more persistent for those who saw Arabs 
and Muslims in that light, and their effects on war support were partially mediated by worsened 
feelings about Arabs and Muslims in general.  These findings help explain why public 
belligerence toward Iraq shot up right after 9/11, before President George W. Bush began 






Anger and desires to avenge the 11 September 2001 terror attacks on New York and 
Washington apparently heightened U.S. public support for war against Iraq, but it remains 
unclear why.  War support surged right after 9/11, in the absence of any evidence linking Iraq to 
the 9/11 attacks or al Qaeda, months before President George W. Bush accused that country of 
being part of an “Axis of Evil,” and almost a year before he began vigorously campaigning for 
war.1  Relatively angry and punitive citizens also tended to be more hawkish on Iraq, and many 
said that war would help satisfy a desire to avenge 9/11.2  Americans who mistakenly believed 
that Iraq had been involved in the attacks would have favored retaliation to neutralize the Iraqi 
threat, to promote general deterrence, or to obtain justice.3  But mistaken revenge does not tell 
the whole story.  Many citizens who said Iraq had not been involved in 9/11 nonetheless also 
acknowledged feeling that war would satisfy their desires for revenge.4   
We argue here that many Americans wanted to lash out at Iraq because they saw it as part 
of an “Arab–Muslim world” to which the actual terrorist culprits also belonged.  Similar effects 
have been observed in conflicts among rival gangs, clans, ethnic groups, and belligerents in 
ideological civil wars, in which members of an externally injured group support “vicarious 
                                                     
1 Peter Liberman and Linda J. Skitka, "Revenge in US Public Support for War against Iraq," Public Opinion 
Quarterly 81, no. 3 (Fall 2017): 636–37. On the administration’s campaign to sell the war, see Jon Western, "The 
War over Iraq: Selling War to the American Public," Security Studies 14, no. 1 (2005): 106–139. 
2 Peter Liberman, "An Eye for an Eye: Public Support for War against Evildoers," International Organization 
60, no. 3 (July 2006): 687–722; Linda J. Skitka, Christopher W. Bauman, Nicholas P. Aramovich, and G. Scott 
Morgan, "Confrontational and Preventative Policy Responses to Terrorism: Anger Wants a Fight and Fear Wants 
‘Them’ to Go Away," Basic and Applied Social Psychology 28, no. 4 (2006): 375–384; Leonie Huddy, Stanley 
Feldman, and Erin Cassese, "On the Distinct Political Effects of Anxiety and Anger," in The Affect Effect: Dynamics 
of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior, ed. W. Russell Neuman, et al. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2007); Liberman and Skitka, "Revenge in US Public Support for War." 
3 On the prevalence of such beliefs, and their connection to war support, see Steven Kull, Clay Ramsay, and 
Evan Lewis, "Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq War," Political Science Quarterly 118, no. 4 (Winter 2003–
04): 569–598; Scott L. Althaus and Devon M. Largio, "When Osama Became Saddam: Origins and Consequences 
of the Change in America's Public Enemy #1," PS: Political Science & Politics 37, no. 4 (October 2004): 795–799; 
Liberman and Skitka, "Revenge in US Public Support for War." 
4 Ibid. 
 3 
retribution” against uninvolved members of the perpetrator’s group.5  The same underlying 
psychological mechanisms are likely to enflame antagonisms across international borders as well 
as within them.  Yet, although there are large literatures on intergroup perceptions, emotions, and 
aggression, research remains quite limited on vicarious retribution, particularly in the 
international context.  We thus explain when and how the vicarious retribution model should be 
extended to foreign policy opinion, and test several hypotheses using survey data from 2001–
2002 on U.S. public reactions to 9/11 and support for war against Iraq.  Our analysis extends the 
literature on public support for war against Iraq, which up until now has included some studies 
on the role of anger and punitiveness and others on the role of prejudice, but none focusing on 
their interaction.6    
Vicarious retribution merits attention from international security scholars and 
policymakers because public opinion affects democracies’ ability to wage war.  Although leaders 
can manipulate or ignore public opinion to a degree, they generally need to mobilize popular 
support to bring a democracy to war.7  Understanding the psychological mechanisms affecting 
                                                     
5 Social psychology research on vicarious retribution includes Brian Lickel, Norman Miller, Douglas M. 
Stenstrom, Thomas F. Denson, and Toni Schmader, "Vicarious Retribution: The Role of Collective Blame in 
Intergroup Aggression," Personality and Social Psychology Review 10, no. 4 (2006): 372–390; Douglas M. 
Stenstrom, Brian Lickel, Thomas F. Denson, and Norman Miller, "The Roles of Ingroup Identification and Outgroup 
Entitativity in Intergroup Retribution," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 34, no. 11 (2008): 1570–1582; 
Eduardo A. Vasquez, Lisa Wenborne, Madeline Peers, Emma Alleyne, and Kirsty Ellis, "Any of Them Will Do: In‐
Group Identification, Out‐Group Entitativity, and Gang Membership as Predictors of Group‐Based Retribution," 
Aggressive Behavior 41, no. 3 (January 2015): 242–252.  For studies of similar effects in civil wars, though termed 
“generalized retribution,” “ethnic hatred,” or “blood revenge,” see Roger D. Petersen, Understanding Ethnic 
Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth Century Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002); Anne Speckhard and Khapta Ahkmedova, "The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism," 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 5 (2006): 429–492; Emil Aslan Souleimanov and Huseyn Aliyev, "Blood 
Revenge and Violent Mobilization: Evidence from the Chechen Wars," International Security 40, no. 2 (Fall 2015): 
158–180; Laia Balcells, Rivalry and Revenge: The Politics of Violence During Civil War (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017). 
6 The former are cited in fn. 2 above; the latter include Donald R. Kinder and Cindy D. Kam, Us Against Them: 
Ethnocentric Foundations of American Opinion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010); John Sides and 
Kimberly Gross, "Stereotypes of Muslims and Support for the War on Terror," Journal of Politics 75, no. 3 (2013): 
583–598.  
7 Matthew A. Baum and Philip B. K. Potter, War and Democratic Constraint: How the Public Influences 
Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015). 
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popular bellicosity thus illuminates the political constraints on democratic war-making.  If 
vicarious retribution following 9/11 affected U.S. public support for war against Iraq, then a 
future terrorist attack or national injury also might create opportunities for leaders to pursue 
strategically unrelated war agendas.  Vicarious retribution also could affect war decisions more 
directly, if—as a growing literature contends—retribution and anger sometimes influence 
leaders’ own thinking.8   Even if such effects are rare, they potentially could cause costly wars, 
counter-retaliation, and further cycles of violence. 
The next section discusses the causes of vicarious retribution and its consequences for 
foreign policy opinion, explains why vicarious retribution was likely to have affected post-9/11 
U.S. opinion, and reviews previously available evidence on this hypothesis.  The following 
section provides new evidence for the vicarious retribution account, and the article concludes by 
discussing implications for the roles of emotion, values, and identity in foreign policy opinion 
and international conflict. 
 
Vicarious retribution and support for war 
Whereas ordinary retribution punishes those who committed a crime, vicarious 
retribution targets a particular class of non-perpetrators—those who share a common identity or 
group membership with the actual culprits.9  Vicarious retribution research builds on extensive 
social psychology findings that people who identify strongly with a group react with outrage and 
                                                     
8 Oded Löwenheim and Gadi Heimann, "Revenge in International Politics," Security Studies 17, no. 4 (2008): 
685–724;  Richard Ned Lebow, Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010); Alexander Lanoszka and Michael A. Hunzeker, "Rage of Honor: Entente Indignation and 
the Lost Chance for Peace in the First World War," Security Studies 24, no. 4 (October-December 2015): 662–695; 
Todd H. Hall, "On Provocation: Outrage, International Relations, and the Franco–Prussian War," Security Studies 
26, no. 1 (2017): 1–29.  
9 Lickel et al., "Vicarious Retribution"; Stenstrom et al., "Ingroup Identification and Outgroup Entitativity"; 
Vasquez et al., "Any of Them Will Do."  
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desires for revenge following a serious crime against fellow group members.10  Rather than 
examining the causes of intergroup anger, however, this research has focused on how perceived 
group categorization affects aggressiveness toward uninvolved targets.  Although this literature 
has addressed neither the rationality of vicarious retribution nor its international manifestations, 
there are good reasons to expect that under certain conditions it can generate non-prudential 
public support for military force. 
 
Psychological mechanisms 
One of the main findings of prior vicarious retribution research is that animosity and 
punishment toward the offenders’ entire group is heightened by perceptions of that group as 
homogenous, cohesive, or both.  Because an outgroup’s perceived homogeneity and 
cohesiveness have been found to have convergent consequences for intergroup emotions and 
attitudes, social psychologists use the single term “entitativity” to describe both attributes.11   
One can imagine entitativity perceptions, if accurate, providing some strategically useful 
information.  The perceived similarity of group members, for example, might extend to their 
propensity for aggressive behavior.  In addition, the more cohesive the outgroup, the more likely 
its members endorse or support each other’s actions, and the more likely that aggressive 
members can be deterred by threats against their uninvolved brethren.  Indeed, there is some 
                                                     
10 Reviewed by Diane M. Mackie and Eliot R. Smith, "Intergroup Emotions," in APA Handbook of Personality 
and Social Psychology, Volume 2: Group Processes, ed. Mario Mikulincer, et al. (Washington, D.C.: American 
Psychological Association, 2015).  
11 Donald T. Campbell, "Common Fate, Similarity, and Other Indices of the Status of Aggregates of Persons as 
Social Entities," Behavioral Science 3, no. 1 (1958): 14–25; David L. Hamilton, Steven J. Sherman, Sara A. Crump, 
and Julie Spencer-Rodgers, "The Role of Entitativity in Stereotyping," in Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and 
Discrimination, ed. Todd D. Nelson (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2009). 
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evidence from small group research that vicarious retribution is intended to send a “don’t mess 
with us” signal to the perpetrator or other potential antagonists.12      
However, people often overestimate outgroup entitativity.  Cognitive biases promote 
oversimplified perceptions of group boundaries and diversity.13  Anger, even if generally helpful 
to rational decision-making, tends to distort judgment and behavior in ways that result in 
excessive and misdirected punishment.14  For example, feelings of anger aroused following a 
serious crime against one’s group heighten stereotypical perceptions of social groups and 
prejudice, even when the anger is unrelated to a judgment task at hand (i.e., “incidental anger”).15   
In addition, people who have been personally insulted or offended, when they cannot take 
revenge against the perpetrator, sometimes lash out in displaced aggression against uninvolved 
bystanders.16  Even just learning about serious, unpunished crimes against others arouses a 
                                                     
12 Arne Sjöström, Zoe Magraw-Mickelson, and Mario Gollwitzer, "What Makes Displaced Revenge Taste 
Sweet: Retributing Displaced Responsibility or Sending a Message to the Original Perpetrator?" European Journal 
of Social Psychology 48, no. 4 (June 2018): 490–506.  
13 For reviews of the large literature supporting this finding, see Craig McGarty, Vincent Y. Yzerbyt, and 
Russell Spears, Stereotypes as Explanations: The Formation of Meaningful Beliefs About Social Groups 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Carey K. Morewedge and Daniel Kahneman, "Associative 
Processes in Intuitive Judgment," Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14, no. 10 (2010): 435–440. Even policymakers 
often exaggerate the entitativity of foreign actors; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International 
Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 8. 
14 Jennifer S. Lerner and Larissa Z. Tiedens, "Portrait of the Angry Decision Maker: How Appraisal Tendencies 
Shape Anger's Influence on Cognition," Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 19, no. 2 (2006): 115–137; Paul M. 
Litvak, Jennifer S. Lerner, Larissa Z. Tiedens, and Katherine Shonk, "Fuel in the Fire: How Anger Impacts 
Judgment and Decision-Making," in International Handbook of Anger: Constituent and Concomitant Biological, 
Psychological, and Social Processes, ed. Michael Potegal, Gerhard Stemmler, and Charles Spielberger (New York: 
Springer, 2010).   
15 Galen V. Bodenhausen, Lori A. Sheppard, and Geoffrey P. Kramer, "Negative Affect and Social Judgment: 
The Differential Impact of Anger and Sadness," European Journal of Social Psychology 24, no. 1 (1994): 45–62; 
David DeSteno, Nilanjana Dasgupta, Monica Y. Bartlett, and Aida Cajdric, "Prejudice from Thin Air: The Effect of 
Emotion on Automatic Intergroup Attitudes," Psychological Science 15, no. 5 (2004): 319–324; Nilanjana 
Dasgupta, David DeSteno, Lisa A. Williams, and Matthew Hunsinger, "Fanning the Flames of Prejudice: The 
Influence of Specific Incidental Emotions on Implicit Prejudice," Emotion 9, no. 4 (2009): 585–591; Antoine J 
Banks, Anger and Racial Politics: The Emotional Foundation of Racial Attitudes in America (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014); Jonathan Renshon, Jooa Julia Lee, and Dustin Tingley, "Physiological Arousal 
and Political Beliefs," Political Psychology 36, no. 5 (October 2015): 569–585. 
16 Amy Marcus-Newhall, William C. Pedersen, Mike Carlson, and Norman Miller, "Displaced Aggression Is 
Alive and Well: A Meta-Analytic Review," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 78, no. 4 (2000): 670–
689; Norman Miller, William C. Pedersen, Mitchell Earleywine, and Vicki E. Pollock, "A Theoretical Model of 
Triggered Displaced Aggression," Personality and Social Psychology Review 7, no. 1 (2003): 75–97; Brad J. 
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“prosecutorial mindset” that leads to harsher judgments and greater punitiveness toward 
completely unrelated suspects and offenders.17  Vivid and emotionally arousing crime-scene 
details providing no incriminating evidence also increase the likelihood of a guilty verdicts.18   
These effects have been experimentally demonstrated in mainly interpersonal and 
intragroup social contexts. But they likely occur in intergroup contexts as well, because 
intergroup emotions parallel ordinary social emotions for those who identify strongly with the 
affected group.19  Just as imminent personal threats elicit fear for one’s own safety, imminent 
threats to fellow group members elicit genuine fear for the group’s safety, even when one is not 
personally endangered.  Similarly, offenses against one’s ingroup, regardless of whether one is 
personally affected, arouse anger and aggressiveness toward the offending outgroup, which are 
attenuated by successful intergroup retribution.20  Beyond identification with the ingroup, factors 
                                                     
Bushman, Angelica M. Bonacci, William C. Pedersen, Eduardo A. Vasquez, and Norman Miller, "Chewing on It 
Can Chew You Up: Effects of Rumination on Triggered Displaced Aggression," Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 88 no. 6 (2005): 969–983; Arne Sjöström and Mario Gollwitzer, "Displaced Revenge: Can Revenge 
Taste ‘Sweet’ If It Aims at a Different Target?," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 56 (2015): 191–202. 
17 Jennifer S. Lerner, Jennifer H. Goldberg, and Philip E. Tetlock, "Sober Second Thought: The Effects of 
Accountability, Anger, and Authoritarianism on Attributions of Responsibility," Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin 24, no. 6 (1998): 563–574; Julie H. Goldberg, Jennifer S. Lerner, and Philip E. Tetlock, "Rage and Reason: 
The Psychology of the Intuitive Prosecutor," European Journal of Social Psychology 29, no. 5–6 (1999): 781–795; 
Derek D. Rucker, Mark Polifroni, Philip E. Tetlock, and Amanda L. Scott, "On the Assignment of Punishment: The 
Impact of General-Societal Threat and the Moderating Role of Severity," Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin 30, no. 6 (2004): 273–284; Philip E. Tetlock, Penny S. Visser, Ramadhar Singh, Mark Polifroni, Amanda 
Scott, Beth Elson, Philip Mazzocco, and Phillip Rescober, "People as Intuitive Prosecutors: The Impact of Social-
Control Goals on Attributions of Responsibility," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 43, no. 2 (2007): 195–
209. 
18 E.g., James R. P. Ogloff and Neil Vidmar, "The Impact of Pretrial Publicity on Jurors," Law and Human 
Behavior 18, no. 5 (1994): 507–526; Kevin S. Douglas, David R. Lyon, and James R. P. Ogloff, "The Impact of 
Graphic Photographic Evidence on Mock Jurors' Decisions in a Murder Trial: Probative or Prejudicial?," Law and 
Human Behavior 21, no. 5 (1997): 485–501. 
19 Eliot R. Smith, Charles R. Seger, and Diane M. Mackie, "Can Emotions Be Truly Group Level? Evidence 
Regarding Four Conceptual Criteria," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 93, no. 3 (2007): 431–446. 
20 Diane M. Mackie, Thierry Devos, and Eliot R. Smith, "Intergroup Emotions: Explaining Offensive Action 
Tendencies in an Intergroup Context," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 79, no. 4 (2000): 602–616; 
Ernestine H. Gordijn, Vincent Yzerbyt, Daniel Wigboldus, and Muriel Dumont, "Emotional Reactions to Harmful 
Intergroup Behavior," European Journal of Social Psychology 36 (2006): 15–30; Angela T. Maitner, Diane M. 
Mackie, and Eliot R. Smith, "Evidence for the Regulatory Function of Intergroup Emotion: Emotional 
Consequences of Implemented or Impeded Intergroup Action Tendencies," Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology 42, no. 6 (2006): 720–728. 
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affecting anger in interpersonal and social contexts—e.g., the degree and intent of harm done and 
the victim’s strength relative to that of the offender—typically have analogous effects on 
intergroup anger as well.21   
There exists little experimental evidence bearing on whether anger at particular outgroup 
offenders causes specifically counter-productive aggressiveness toward the offenders’ kin.  But 
incidental intergroup emotions have “spillover” effects affecting judgments and decisions that 
are unrelated to the triggering stimuli, similar to those occurring in intragroup contexts.22  It is 
also suggestive that displaced aggression is more likely against bystanders who resemble the 
perpetrator of an unpunished offense, in experiments that minimize reputational incentives to 
show toughness.23  This effect’s similarity to vicarious retribution suggests common underlying 
psychological mechanisms.   
The potentially counter-productive nature of vicarious retribution gains further 
plausibility from ordinary people’s frequently non-instrumental motives for punishing or 
supporting the punishment of actual transgressors.  Research on criminal punishment judgments 
and cooperation games shows that people often favor punishing offenders for the sake of 
“justice” or “just deserts” rather than for security or material gain.  Sometimes they even will pay 
to punish, whether to assuage the victim’s self-esteem, to satisfy the principle of “an eye for an 
                                                     
21 Mackie, Devos, and Smith, "Intergroup Emotions"; Martijn van Zomeren, Tom Postmes, and Russell Spears, 
"Toward an Integrative Social Identity Model of Collective Action: A Quantitative Research Synthesis of Three 
Socio-Psychological Perspectives," Psychological Bulletin 134, no. 4 (2008): 504–535; Roger Giner-Sorolla and 
Angela T. Maitner, "Angry at the Unjust, Scared of the Powerful: Emotional Responses to Terrorist Threat," 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 39, no. 8 (2013): 1069–1082. 
22 Jennifer S. Lerner, Roxana M. Gonzalez, Deborah A. Small, and Baruch Fischhoff, "Effects of Fear and 
Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism," Psychological Science 14, no. 2 (2003): 144–150; Randy J. Rydell, Diane 
M. Mackie, Angela T. Maitner, Heather M. Claypool, Melissa J. Ryan, and Eliot R. Smith, "Arousal, Processing, 
and Risk Taking: Consequences of Intergroup Anger," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 34, no. 8 (2008): 
1141–1152.   
23 Marcus-Newhall et al., "Displaced Aggression"; Sjöström and Gollwitzer, "Displaced Revenge."    
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eye,” or simply to satisfy a felt need to aggress following a humiliating injury.24  Cost-benefit 
calculations are also often curtailed in ordinary people’s thinking about intergroup conflicts over 
“sacred values,” including avenging a humiliating injury.25  
 
Implications for foreign policy opinion  
Nationalism provides a powerful source of ingroup identification, generating strong 
emotional reactions on behalf of one’s nation.26  This makes it at least plausible that external 
crimes against one’s nation would sometimes boost support for the use of force against 
uninvolved foreign states.  Such a hawkish reaction would be consistent with limited-information 
pragmatism theories of foreign policy opinion if it is intended to send a deterrent message to 
would-be enemies, but not if it is driven by the conflation of foreign actors, a displaced wish for 
justice, or some other anger spillover effect.27  
Vicarious retribution provides a compelling explanation for non-instrumental public 
support for attacking innocent civilian citizens within an offending state.  Following Japan’s 
defeat in 1945, for example, 13% of Americans wanted to “kill all Japanese” and 23% wished 
                                                     
24 Kevin M. Carlsmith and John M. Darley, "Psychological Aspects of Retributive Justice," Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology 41 (2008): 193–236; Thomas Nadelhoffer, Saeideh Heshmati, Deanna Kaplan, and 
Shaun Nichols, "Folk Retributivism and the Communication Confound," Economics and Philosophy 29, no. 2 (July 
2013): 235–261.  
25 Jeremy Ginges, Scott Atran, Douglas Medin, and Khalil Shikaki, "Sacred Bounds on Rational Resolution of 
Violent Political Conflict," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104, no. 18 (2007): 7357-7360; 
Jeremy Ginges and Scott Atran, "War as a Moral Imperative (Not Just Practical Politics by Other Means)," 
Proceedings of the Royal Society Biological Sciences 278, no. 1720 (2011): 2930–2938; Alan Page Fiske and Tage 
Shakti Rai, Virtuous Violence: Hurting and Killing to Create, Sustain, End, and Honor Social Relationships (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).  
26 Richard K. Herrmann, Pierangelo Isernia, and Paolo Segatti, "Attachment to the Nation and International 
Relations: Dimensions of Identity and Their Relationship to War and Peace," Political Psychology 30, no. 5 (2009): 
721–754; Jonathan Mercer, "Feeling Like a State: Social Emotion and Identity," International Theory 6, no. 3 
(2014): 515–535; Todd H. Hall and Andrew A. G. Ross, "Affective Politics after 9/11," International Organization 
69, no.4  (Fall 2015): 1–33; Richard K. Herrmann, "How Attachments to the Nation Shape Beliefs About the World: 
A Theory of Motivated Reasoning," International Organization 71, no. S1 (April 2017): S61–S84. 
27 Research on the prudential nature of foreign policy includes Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason 
Reifler, Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2009). 
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that Truman had dropped “many more” atomic bombs “before Japan had a chance to 
surrender.”28  More recently, over 40% of U.S. citizens preferred a nuclear attack killing 100,000 
Iranian civilians to a near-unconditional Iranian surrender, following an Iranian attack on U.S. 
forces in a hypothetical conflict in the Persian Gulf.29   
Vicarious retribution might have a weaker impact on support for attacking an uninvolved 
state than enemy civilians.  States that share a common ethnicity, religion, or ideology frequently 
experience internecine rivalry and conflict, and thus might be perceived as less entitative than the 
citizens and leaders within a single state.30  In addition, starting a war against a new adversary is 
usually more costly than attacking defenseless civilians during an ongoing war, at least—as in 
the situations just mentioned—when the enemy state cannot reciprocate.  That said, ordinary 
citizens are often uninformed about the differences and conflicts among foreign states and actors, 
including those sharing religious, ethnic, or ideological traits. Limited foreign affairs knowledge 
also often leaves citizens uncertain about the costs of war.31  Thus ordinary citizens might 
support vicarious retribution against uninvolved states, at least when the net costs are not 
obviously prohibitive.  
An international analogue of vicarious retribution differs from other ascriptive theories of 
international conflict.  Unlike Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” or other theories tracing 
international conflict to incompatible ideas, vicarious retribution is generated by mere group 
                                                     
28 John Dower, War Without Mercy (New York: Pantheon, 1986), 54–55. 
29 Scott D. Sagan and Benjamin A. Valentino, "Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran: What Americans Really Think 
About Using Nuclear Weapons and Killing Noncombatants," International Security 42, no. 1 (Summer 2017): 41–
79.   
30 Erik Gartzke and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Identity and Conflict: Ties That Bind and Differences That 
Divide," European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 1 (2006): 53–87. 
31 Michael Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter, What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).  
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categorization, regardless of ideational content.32  That categorization can be based on ethnicity, 
not just religion or ideology.  In addition, recent intergroup injuries play a catalytic role in 
vicarious retribution but not in purely ideational theories. 
Vicarious retribution should shape public opinion in several ways.  Individual differences 
in perceptions of the outgroup as entitative should affect aggressiveness toward uninvolved 
members of the perpetrator’s broader identity group.  In other words, the effect of anger and 
revenge on support for force against uninvolved outgroup members should be magnified by the 
perceived entitativity of the outgroup (i.e., the perceived entitativity hypothesis).33  Attributions 
of blame to the perpetrators’ group due to its perceived entitativity also should sustain anger over 
the original offense even after punishing the actual perpetrators (i.e., the anger persistence 
hypothesis).   
Given some degree of perceived outgroup entitativity, those who feel greater anger and 
desires for revenge toward the perpetrator will generally express greater hostility toward the 
perpetrator’s outgroup (i.e., the anger–outgroup hostility hypothesis) and greater support for 
using military force against uninvolved members of the perpetrator’s group (i.e., the anger–
vicarious retribution hypothesis).  Feelings of anger are likely to further bias perceptions of 
entitativity, due to heightened categorical thinking and motivated reasoning.34  In theory, that 
could have recursive feedback effects, with anger at the perpetrators broadening the attribution of 
                                                     
32  Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1996); Mark L. Haas, Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789–1989 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2005); John M. Owen, The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and 
Regime Change, 1510–2010 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Tanisha M. Fazal and Brooke C. Greene, 
"A Particular Difference: European Identity and Civilian Targeting,” British Journal of Political Science 45, no. 4 
(October 2015): 829-851. 
33 Throughout this article we equate revenge and retribution, and lump them together with anger, because we 
lack theoretical and empirical reasons to differentiate them here. 
34 Lerner and Tiedens, "Portrait of the Angry Decision Maker"; Litvak et al., "Fuel in the Fire.”  
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blame to the perpetrators’ kin.35  Thus, hostility toward the outgroup, once aroused, will itself 
heighten support for war against its uninvolved members.  This would be manifested in an 
indirect effect of anger and desires for revenge against the actual perpetrator on war support, via 
hostility to the outgroup (i.e., the hostility diffusion hypothesis). 
Although not specifically tested here, additional hypotheses spring from the mechanisms 
assumed to cause vicarious retribution.  For example, individual differences affecting anger 
toward the perpetrators, such as exposure to information about offenses (especially the harm 
caused and intent) and predispositions to react angrily to provocation, should also affect 
vicarious retribution.  In addition, an offense against a country will increase its public’s hostility 
and aggressiveness toward uninvolved foreign states, leaders, and peoples sharing at least 
superficially similar traits with the perpetrator (these might be described as national injury 
hypotheses).   
Prior evidence for vicarious retribution in U.S. public support for war against Iraq 
The hypothesized sources of vicarious retribution were present in spades in post-9/11 
America.  The attacks’ horrific lethality and destruction of national symbols, al Qaeda’s top 
ringleaders having escaped punishment, a national mantra of “never forget,” and extensive media 
coverage combined to generate intense and prolonged public outrage.  Although this anger ebbed 
somewhat over time, on the first anniversary of 9/11 two thirds of the public reported still feeling 
“very angry at the people who did this.”36  Even several years later, President Barack Obama 
                                                     
35 Brian M. Quigley and James T. Tedeschi, "Mediating Effects of Blame Attributions on Feelings of Anger," 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 22, no. 12 (1996): 1280–1288.  For possible intergroup evidence of this, 
see Eran Halperin and James J. Gross, "Intergroup Anger in Intractable Conflict: Long-Term Sentiments Predict 
Anger Responses During the Gaza War," Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 14, no. 4 (2010): 477–488. 
36 ABC News, "September 11th Adult Poll, September 2002," archived at the Inter-university Consortium for 
Political and Social Research, University of Michigan, Study 3553. 
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prioritized hunting down bin Laden not just to take “a monstrous leader off the battlefield,” but 
also because of the importance of “righting an unspeakable wrong” and “healing a nearly 
unbearable wound in America’s heart.”37   
Although data is lacking on this point, it seems probable that more U.S. citizens knew 
that Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein were Arab and Muslim than that they held radically 
opposing religious and political beliefs and despised each other.  Public dislike of Saddam 
Hussein ever since his 1990 invasion of Kuwait made Iraq a prominent potential lightning rod.  
Many citizens were probably uncertain whether the costs of toppling the Iraqi regime 
outweighed the potential benefits of stopping its alleged pursuit of WMDs.  Such propitious 
conditions make this episode a useful initial probe of vicarious retribution’s impact on public 
support for war. 
Although falling well short of a compelling case, previously available evidence is largely 
consistent with a vicarious retribution account.  The post-9/11 surge in public belligerence 
toward Iraq, followed by a gradual decline, is consistent with the national injury hypothesis.38  
Thermometer scale ratings of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Yassir Arafat, and Saddam Hussein all 
declined to a significant degree between 1998 and 2002, while the average ratings for non-Arab 
and non-Muslim states and leaders held steady over the same time period.39  Moreover, the 
correlations observed between war support and anger over 9/11, as well as that between between 
                                                     
37 Joseph Biden, "Speech to the Democratic National Convention (Prepared Remarks)," Washington Post, 
September 6 2012. 
38 Liberman and Skitka, "Revenge in US Public Support for War," 636–37.  Earlier observations of this “9/11 
effect” include Douglas C. Foyle, "Leading the Public to War? The Influence of American Public Opinion on the 
Bush Administration's Decision to Go to War in Iraq," International Journal of Public Opinion Research 16, no. 3 
(September 2004): 269–294 and Philip Everts and Pierangelo Isernia, "The Polls–Trends: The War in Iraq," Public 
Opinion Quarterly 69, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 264–323. 
39 Authors’ analysis of Chicago Council on Foreign Relations surveys conducted October 15–November 10, 
1998 and in June 1–30, 2002, archived at the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, 
University of Michigan, Study 33673. 
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war support and punitive dispositions, are consistent with the anger–vicarious retribution 
hypothesis.40   
In addition, after 9/11 over two thirds of the U.S. public agreed that “the Muslim world 
considers itself at war with the U.S.” and 25–39% said they had an “unfavorable opinion of 
Islam.”  Between a seventh and a quarter of the public said their feelings about Arab Americans 
had worsened due to the attack, a third said that Arab Americans were relatively sympathetic to 
terrorists, and 40% agreed that “the attacks on America represent the true teachings of Islam.” 41 
Hate crimes and economic discrimination against American Arabs and Muslims spiked 
nationwide after 9/11.42  Although we have not found repeated measures of prejudice toward 
Arab Americans before and after 9/11, data from other countries reveal increased prejudice 
toward Arabs following major terror attacks.43   
Two additional findings are consistent with a vicarious retribution account.  First, nearly 
a decade after 9/11, Americans expressed higher levels of support for force against an 
unidentified Muslim nuclear proliferator than an otherwise-identical Christian one.44  Second, 
feelings that the Iraq War would avenge 9/11, measured around the time that the war began, 
correlated with prejudice against Muslims measured eight years later.45 Because it is difficult to 
                                                     
40 Liberman, "Eye for an Eye”; Skitka et al., "Confrontational and Preventative Policy Responses"; Huddy, 
Feldman, and Cassese, "Distinct Political Effects.”  
41 Costas Panagopoulos, "The Polls–Trends: Arab and Muslim Americans and Islam in the Aftermath of 9/11," 
Public Opinion Quarterly 70, no. 4 (Winter 2006): 608–624.  
42 G. Scott Morgan, Daniel C. Wisneski, and Linda J. Skitka, "The Expulsion from Disneyland: The Social 
Psychological Impact of 9/11," American Psychologist 66, no. 6 (September 2011): 447–454.   
43 Daniel Bar-Tal and Daniela Labin, "The Effect of a Major Event on Stereotyping: Terrorist Attacks in Israel 
and Israeli Adolescents' Perceptions of Palestinians, Jordanians, and Arabs," European Journal of Social Psychology 
31, no. 3 (2001): 265–280; Agustin Echebarria-Echabe and Emilia Fernandez-Guede, "Effects of Terrorism on 
Attitudes and Ideological Orientation," European Journal of Social Psychology 36, no. 2 (March/April 2006): 259–
265.  
44 Robert Johns and Graeme A. M. Davies, "Democratic Peace or Clash of Civilizations? Target States and 
Support for War in Britain and the United States," Journal of Politics 74, no. 4 (October 2012): 1038–1052. 
However, this finding could have been due to a longstanding antipathy to Islam or to implicitly evoked attitudes 
about Iran, rather than to vicarious retribution. 
45 Liberman and Skitka, "Revenge in US Public Support for War," 648. 
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imagine a mechanism by which retributive satisfaction from invading Iraq would have shaped 
prejudice against Muslims, it seems more likely that both had been affected by citizens blaming 
the “Muslim world” for 9/11.  
However, there remain significant gaps and open questions concerning the impact of 
vicarious retribution.  Thermometer ratings of Muslim Americans did not significantly worsen 
after the attacks, and did not predict retrospective support for the Iraq War in 2004. 46  Worsened 
views of foreign Muslims might have caused vicarious retribution.  But thermometer ratings did 
not drop for all Muslim states—those for Iran and Turkey did not worsen as they did for Saudi 
Arabia, Pakistan, Yassir Arafat, and Saddam Hussein.47      
Moreover, other factors might have been responsible for many of the findings consistent 
with the vicarious retribution account.  For example, mistaken beliefs that Iraq was involved in 
9/11 could have heightened belligerence toward Iraq as well as its correlation with anger at the 
terrorists.48  Alternatively, anger at the terrorists could have shaped support for the Iraq War by 
making citizens more aggressive and risk acceptant, rather than by arousing vicarious retribution.  
Jennifer Lerner and colleagues have shown that anger, including anger over 9/11, tends to 
diminish appraisals of future unrelated risks, whereas fear has the opposite effects.49  Indeed, 
Huddy and colleagues found that angry citizens expressed greater optimism about the risks of 
                                                     
46 On feelings about Muslim Americans, see Kerem Ozan Kalkan, Geoffrey C. Layman, and Eric M. Uslaner, 
"‘Bands of Others?’ Attitudes toward Muslims in Contemporary American Society," Journal of Politics 71, no. 3 
(July 2009): 847–862.  Feelings about Muslims did worsen in the Netherlands after 9/11, however; Jolanda Van der 
Noll, "The Aftermath of 9/11: Tolerance toward Muslims, Islamophobia and Value Orientations," in Islamophobia 
in the West: Measuring and Explaining Individual Attitudes, ed. Marc Helbling (New York: Routledge, 2012).  On 
Islamophobia and Iraq War attitudes in 2004, see Sides and Gross, "Stereotypes of Muslims." 
47 Authors’ analysis of data from the 1998 and 2002 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations surveys described in 
n. 39. 
48 On the prevalence and potential consequences of these beliefs, see Kull, Ramsay, and Lewis, 
"Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq War" and Althaus and Largio, "When Osama Became Saddam." For 
evidence that these misperceptions were less important than might be expected had they represented firm beliefs, see 
Liberman and Skitka, "Revenge in US Public Support for War." 
49 This study manipulated anger and fear through a reflection exercise but did not measure attitudes about Iraq; 
Lerner et al., "Effects of Fear and Anger."  
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war with Iraq.50  Yet another possibility is that confidence in U.S. strength made some citizens 
both angrier and more bellicose, resulting in a spurious correlation between these reactions.51  
Heightened post-9/11 perceptions of the Iraqi threat or halo effects from the perceived terrorist 
threat also might have accounted for some of these longitudinal and cross-sectional findings.  
Past research has frequently found associations between threat perceptions, anger, prejudice, and 
belligerence, including in post-9/11 public opinion.52 
Individual differences in ethnocentrism—i.e., perceptions that one’s ingroup is superior 
to all other outgroups—might have been responsible for observed correlations between feelings 
about Arabs or Muslims and support for war against states identified as Arab or Muslim.  
Ethnocentrism predicted support for war against Iraq in Fall 2002 and was a strong predictor of 
feelings about Muslims both before and after 9/11.53  This ethnocentric aggressiveness would be 
similar to vicarious retribution if it was activated by angry desires to avenge 9/11 and focused on 
                                                     
50 Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese, "Distinct Political Effects." 
51 On this effect after 9/11, see Charles S. Carver, "Negative Affects Deriving from the Behavioral Approach 
System," Emotion 4, no. 1 (2004): 3–22. More generally, see also Mackie, Devos, and Smith, "Intergroup 
Emotions."; Aaron Sell, John Tooby, and Leda Cosmides, "Formidability and the Logic of Human Anger," 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106, no. 35 (2009): 15073–15078. For evidence differentiating 
effects of injustice and power in responses to terror attacks, see Giner-Sorolla and Maitner, "Angry at the Unjust." 
52 Arguing that post-9/11 threat perceptions heightened public aggressiveness, see Leonie Huddy, Stanley 
Feldman, Charles Taber, and Gallya Lahav, "Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies," American 
Journal of Political Science 49, no. 3 (2005): 593–608; Tom Pyszczynski, Abdolhossein Abdollahi, Sheldon 
Solomon, Jeff Greenberg, Florette Cohen, and David Weise, "Mortality Salience, Martyrdom, and Military Might: 
The Great Satan Versus the Axis of Evil," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 32, no. 4 (2006): 525–537. 
For social psychological research on intergroup threat, emotions, and prejudice, see Mackie, Devos, and Smith, 
"Intergroup Emotions"; Catherine A. Cottrell and Steven L. Neuberg, "Different Emotional Reactions to Different 
Groups: A Sociofunctional Threat-Based Approach to ‘Prejudice’,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
88, no. 5 (2005): 770–789; Catherine A. Cottrell, David A. R. Richards, and Austin Lee Nichols, "Predicting Policy 
Attitudes from General Prejudice Versus Specific Intergroup Emotions," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 
46, no. 2 (2010): 247–254.  On threat perceptions and hawkish foreign policy attitudes, see, e.g., Richard K. 
Herrmann, Philip E. Tetlock, and Penny S. Visser, "Mass Public Decisions to Go to War: A Cognitive-Interactionist 
Framework," American Political Science Review 93, no. 3 (1999): 553–573. 
53 For the first finding, see Cindy D. Kam and Donald R. Kinder, "Terror and Ethnocentrism: Foundations of 
American Support for the War on Terrorism," Journal of Politics 69, no. 2 (May 2007): 320–338; Kinder and Kam, 
Us Against Them, chap. 4.  The second finding is reported by Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner, "Bands of Others."  
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Muslim and Arab states, but it would represent a competing explanation if activated by 
insecurity, patriotism, or ethnocentric elite discourse, or if directed against all foreign states.  
A final alternative factor to consider is heuristic cue-taking, i.e., citizens echoing 
messages received from trusted political elites, a pervasive influence on public opinion.54  In 
addition to explaining the public’s substantial levels of pre-9/11 support for toppling Saddam 
Hussein, cue taking or differences in news consumption patterns can also account for Democrats’ 
diminishing enthusiasm for war in Fall 2002.55   
However, cue taking has more difficulty explaining the immediate post-9/11 surge in 
support for war against Iraq, which occurred months before President Bush first publicly linked 
Iraq and al-Qaeda, in his January 29th “Axis of Evil” speech.  For the first few months following 
9/11, Administration officials had identified al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden as the central 
culprits and primary threat to the United States.  These messages predominated in media 
coverage.  From September 2001 through January 2002, the Administration mentioned Osama 
bin Laden 50–200 times per month and ABC News did so 150–450 times per month, but neither 
mentioned Saddam Hussein more than twenty times per month.56  The Associated Press 
mentioned Saddam Hussein about as often in first few months after 9/11 as immediately 
before.57  Although a few members of Congress and some experts suggested right after 9/11 that 
Saddam Hussein might have been involved or should be overthrown as part of the “war on 
                                                     
54 John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).  
55 Gary C. Jacobson, "The Public, the President, and the War in Iraq," in The Polarized Presidency of George 
W. Bush, ed. George C. Edwards, III and Desmond S. King (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Adam J. 
Berinsky, In Time of War: Understanding American Public Opinion from World War II to Iraq (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2009). On the effect of news sources on Democrats’ Iraq attitudes, see Stanley Feldman, Leonie 
Huddy, and George E Marcus, Going to War in Iraq: When Citizens and the Press Matter (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2015).  See also Brigitte L. Nacos, Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, and  Robert Y. Shapiro, Selling Fear: 
Counterterrorism, the Media, and Public Opinion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), chap 4. 
56 Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, and Shapiro, Selling Fear, 110. See also Althaus and Largio, "When Osama Became 
Saddam."  
57 Ibid., 796.  
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terrorism,” these signals were probably too weak to have caused the immediate uptick in public 
support for invading Iraq. 
Elite messages nonetheless might have indirectly affected public belligerence toward Iraq 
in this period by fanning concerns about the terrorist threat, anger at the terrorists, and antipathy 
toward Arabs and Muslims.  The news media conveyed and amplified Administration warnings 
about the terror threat.58  In addition, Bush’s rhetoric often seemed tailored to stoking outrage 
and desire for justice against the “evildoers.”59  The Administration avoided condemning the 
Muslim and Arab world, and media criticism of ordinary Muslims actually diminished after 9/11.  
That said, ubiquitous media discussions of “Muslim rage,” “Islamic extremism,” and “Arab 
terrorists” nevertheless could have promoted perceptions of Muslims and Arabs as monolithic, 
dangerous, and evil.60  Some influential voices even openly blamed “Islam” for the 9/11 attacks, 
such as the evangelical leader who proclaimed in November 2001 that “Islam has attacked us…I 
believe it is a very evil and wicked religion.”61  Thus we cannot rule out, a priori, the possibility 
that public cue taking resulted in spurious correlations between anger over 9/11, antipathy 
toward Arabs and Muslims, and support for going to war against Iraq.  
In sum, there already exists ample evidence consistent with vicarious retribution having 
shaped U.S. public support for going to war against Iraq, but the evidence is mostly indirect and 
potentially attributable to other factors and processes.  Further investigation is clearly needed.  
                                                     
58 Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, and Shapiro, Selling Fear, chap. 2.  
59 Ronald R. Krebs and Jennifer K. Lobasz, "Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coercion, and the Road to 
War in Iraq," Security Studies 16, no. 3 (July-September 2007): 409–451; Donileen R. Loseke, "Examining Emotion 
as Discourse: Emotion Codes and Presidential Speeches Justifying War," Sociological Quarterly 50, no. 3 (Summer 
2009): 497–524. 
60 Dina Ibrahim, "The Framing of Islam on Network News Following the September 11th Attacks," 
International Communication Gazette 72, no. 1 (2010): 111–125. 
61 Ervand Abrahamian, "The US Media, Huntington and September 11," Third World Quarterly 24, no. 3 (June 
2003): 529–544.  See also Melina Trevino, Ali M. Kanso, and Richard Alan Nelson, "Islam through Editorial 
Lenses: How American Elite Newspapers Portrayed Muslims before and after September 11, 2001," Journal of Arab 
& Muslim Media Research 3, no. 1 (November 2010): 3–17. 
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Data analysis 
A panel survey of U.S. adult citizens conducted in 2001-2002 by Knowledge Networks 
(now GfK) provides valuable data for this purpose.62  Originally conducted to study how 
emotional reactions to 9/11 and feelings about Arabs and Muslims affected political tolerance, 
the survey also included an item on going to war against Iraq.  It allows testing whether anger 
and desires for revenge against the 9/11 terrorists more strongly predicted support for attacking 
Iraq among citizens who saw Arabs and Muslims as entitative, as well as whether those who 
were relatively angry and vengeful after 9/11 favored war in part because they were 
disproportionately hostile toward Arabs and Muslims.  
The two-wave panel design and the timing of the waves are also helpful.  The first wave 
was fielded right after the attacks, during September 14–October 2, 2001 (N=685), and was 
nearly four fifths complete before President Bush declared a “war on terrorism” in his signal, 
September 20, 2001 address to Congress.  Thus the “September 2001” data, which provides our 
main measure of anger over 9/11, was relatively independent of the Administration’s discourse 
on 9/11.  Measuring war support and feelings about Arabs and Muslims in a second 
questionnaire, fielded December 28, 2001–January 14, 2002 (N=605, representing an 88% 
within-panel cooperation rate), minimizes the possibility that these responses contaminated the 
measure of anger collected four months earlier.  In addition, because this “January 2002” data 
was collected before President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech, at a time when the media was 
providing little reporting on Iraq, elite discourse was relatively unlikely to have shaped how 
                                                     
62 The survey was administered to a random sample of KN’s online panel, which has been found to provide 
population estimates at least as accurate as traditional random-digit-dialing methods; David S. Yeager, Jon A. 
Krosnick, Linchiat Chang, Harold S. Javitz, Matthew S. Levendusky, Alberto Simpser, and Rui Wang, "Comparing 
the Accuracy of RDD Telephone Surveys and Internet Surveys Conducted with Probability and Non-Probability 
Samples," Public Opinion Quarterly 75, no. 4 (November 2011): 1–39. 
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attitudes about Iraq related to anger over 9/11 and anti-Arab–Muslim feeling, except through 
vicarious retribution processes. 
Anger at the Terrorists and Arab–Muslim Entitativity  
Testing whether the perceived entitativity of the outgroup magnified the effect of anger 
and revenge on support for force against uninvolved outgroup members requires measures of 
anger or revenge over 9/11, support for war against Iraq, and perceptions of Arab–Muslim 
entitativity.  For the first of these variables we use September 2001 questions asking how 
strongly respondents felt “angry,” “outrage,” “hatred,” and a “desire to fight back” during “the 
first few hours after learning the news about the terrorist attacks.” As can be seen in Figure 1, 
Americans felt extremely angry in the immediate aftermath of the attacks and continued to report 
high levels of anger in response to similar questions posed in January 2002.63  Although the four 
items within each wave were presented to respondents within a larger, randomly sequenced 
series on varied emotional reactions to the attacks, they loaded strongly on single first-wave and 
second-wave dimensions in a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) model.64  The limited number 
of items and their strong inter-correlations preclude distinguishing between anger, hatred, and 
desires for retribution in our data analysis, and anyway we expect these reactions to have very 
                                                     
63 The January 2002 items were the same except for a change in the wording of the stem to “How do you feel, 
right now, about the events of September 11?”  The two measures were distinct but strongly correlated (r=0.72); see 
Online Appendix [## provide URL here ##] Tables A1 and A2.   
64 Wording and CFA details for all the multi-item measures are provided in the Online Appendix, Tables A1–
A2.  As an indication of the internal reliability of all the multi-item measures in our analysis, additive scales from 
the same items have a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.79 or higher.  Compared to raw score scales, using factor scores 
measures the underlying factor more accurately by weighting each item according to how strongly it reflects that 
factor.  
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similar effects on vicarious retribution.65  We thus measure September 2001 anger at the 
perpetrators using the factor scores from the CFA model and label this scale Anger9/01.66   
 [Figure 1 goes about here] 
 
The war support measure consists of a single January 2002 question on whether “the war 
on terrorism should be expanded to Iraq and any other country suspected of harboring or 
encouraging terrorists.”67  Mentioning other “suspected” countries complicates interpretation of 
affirmative responses as pure support for attacking Iraq.  But the 70% responding “agree” or 
“strongly agree” was close to the results of other contemporaneous poll questions on military 
action against Iraq, whereas questions from that time on military action against Afghanistan or 
other states described as aiding or sheltering terrorists were garnering around 90% support.68  
More importantly, even if the measure captured support for attacking other states, war on the 
mere suspicion of supporting terrorists represents an indiscriminate belligerence akin to vicarious 
retribution.   
For an indirect measure of perceived Arab–Muslim entitativity, we use January 2002 
items asking if, and how much, respondents’ feelings had improved or worsened since 
September 11th about “Palestinians,” “people who live in Islamic or Middle Eastern countries,” 
and “Arab Americans.”69  Although this measure is also likely to reflect negative feelings like 
                                                     
65 On the close psychological relationship between anger and aggressive motivations, see Marcel Zeelenberg, 
Rob M. A. Nelissen, Seger M. Breugelmans, and Rik Pieters, "On Emotion Specificity in Decision Making: Why 
Feeling Is for Doing," Judgment and Decision Making 3, no. 1 (January 2008): 18–27. 
66 Although the January 2002 measure of anger correlated more strongly with war support and negative feelings 
about Arabs and Muslims, which were also measured in that wave, using independent variables measured prior to 
dependent ones lends support to inferring causal direction from observed correlations.  
67 The random error entailed by reliance on a single-item measure makes our tests more conservative than 
comparable tests using multi-item scales. 
68 Leonie Huddy, Nadia Khatib, and Theresa Capelos, "The Polls–Trends: Reactions to the Terrorist Attacks of 
September 11, 2001," Public Opinion Quarterly 66, no. 3 (2002): 418–450; Everts and Isernia, "Polls–Trends,"  
291–295. 
69 Interspersing these among items on a variety of other groups limited artificial consistency due to question-
order effects. 
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anger, fear, and disgust, such feelings would have been worsened mainly by perceived affinities 
or similarities with the actual perpetrators.  Moreover, there is no obvious reason why feelings 
about Arabs and Muslims—apart from the entitativity perceptions underlying them—would have 
magnified the effects of angry reactions to 9/11 on war support.  On the contrary, to the extent 
that emotions are represented in the measure they would tend to obscure rather than simulate the 
hypothesized effect of perceived Arab–Muslim entitativity.   
Although a majority of the public reported unchanged feelings about the three groups, 
28% said they felt “more negative” or “much more negative” about Arab Americans, and 35%–
37% said so about Palestinians and about Islamic or Middle Eastern peoples.  Moreover, 
respondents who reported worsened views of one group were very likely to do so about the other 
two as well.  Of those who said they felt worse about “Islamic or Middle Eastern” peoples, for 
example, 77% said this about Palestinians and 65% did so about Arab Americans.  In contrast, 
among those who reported their feelings about Islamic or Middle Eastern peoples had not 
worsened, just 17% expressed more negative feelings about Palestinians and only 7% did so 
about Arab Americans.  All three items load highly on a common factor in the CFA model, and 
the factor scores from that model provide our proxy measure of perceived Arab–Muslim 
entitativity, which we call Anti-Arab for short.70  
To differentiate retributive from protective motivations linked to anger, our analysis 
controls for perceived threat and fear of terrorism, as well as their own interactions with Anti-
Arab.  We measure the perceived terror threat using January 2002 questions about how 
“worried” respondents were about “future terrorist attacks,” “getting infected with anthrax,” and 
                                                     
70 The only other item about foreigners in this series, one on “Israelis,” loads weakly (0.48) on this factor when 
added to the CFA model, indicating that the factor measures anti-Arab–Muslim feelings rather than just xenophobia 
or ethnocentrism.  
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“other kinds of bioterrorism.”  Questions that ask about “worry” and personal vulnerability 
(salient in the anthrax item) tend to elicit more anxiety than do those asking about “concern 
over” or the “likelihood of” terror attacks on the nation.71  However, also controlling for a clean 
measure of fear, based on January 2002 items asking how “frightened” and “vulnerable” people 
felt when thinking about 9/11, should foreground the effects of objective threat perception in 
Terror Worry’s estimated effects on war support.72  The perceived terrorist threat—controlling 
for fear—ought to have heightened aggressiveness toward Iraq and fear—controlling for threat—
ought to have diminished it.  As expected for anger, both effects should have been stronger 
among those who regarded the Arab–Muslim world as monolithic. 
Figure 2 plots each reaction’s estimated impact on the probability of strong support for 
war, among those who said that 9/11 substantially worsened their views of Arab and Muslim 
groups (those in the 90th percentile of Anti-Arab), and among those who said their views of 
Arabs and Muslims had not worsened at all (those in the 10th percentile).  The three graphs are 
based on an ordered probit regression of Iraq War simultaneously interacting Anti-Arab with 
Anger9/01, Terror Worry, and Fear.  As can be seen in the top left panel, Anger9/01 predicts war 
support more strongly among those high in Anti-Arab.73  This finding is consistent with anger at 
the terrorists being redirected against Iraq by perceptions of a monolithic Arab–Muslim world.   
 [Figure 2 goes about here] 
 
                                                     
71 Huddy et al., "Threat, Anxiety."  
72 The anxiety in Terror Worry is evident by its high correlation with Fear (r=0.77), which exceeds the 
correlation of r=0.60 between anxiety and a more objective measure of national threat reported in Ibid.  Despite this 
correlation and the three interaction terms, multicollinearity is not a problem in the regression model (mean 
VIF=2.69; maximum VIF=4.00).  
73  The interaction is significant at p<0.05 two tailed; for full results see Model 1 of Online Appendix Table A3.  
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The total effect of Anger9/01 on war support, moreover, may have been larger than that 
indicated by Figure 2, which holds Anti-Arab constant. If, as we argue below, anger increased 
Anti-Arab in addition to being channeled by it, and Anti-Arab itself heightened support for war, 
then anger also had an additional indirect effect on war support.  
The other panels in Figure 2 show that Anti-Arab also moderated the effects of threat 
perceptions and fear.  Terror Worry and Fear had no effect on belligerence toward Iraq among 
those low in Anti-Arab, i.e., for those who regarded Arabs and Muslims as diverse and 
fragmented.  In contrast, among those high in Anti-Arab, who presumably perceived a more 
monolithic Arab–Muslim world, Terror Worry predicts greater hawkishness toward Iraq, and 
Fear predicts the opposite (interactions both significant at p<0.01).  These results support the 
validity of Anti-Arab as an indirect measure of perceived Arab–Muslim entitativity, and thus 
further justify interpreting the Anger9/01 X Anti-Arab interaction as evidence for vicarious 
retribution.   
Additional evidence for an entitativity effect can be seen in a test of the anger persistence 
hypothesis.  Even though Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders remained at large in early 
2002, the November 2001 U.S. attack on al Qaeda and the Taliban regime would have done 
more to satiate anger among those who saw the Arab–Muslim world as diverse and fragmented 
than among those who regarded it as more monolithic.  Consistent with this, anger levels 
declined more between September 2001 and January 2002 among those who scored lower in 
Anti-Arab.74  
                                                     
74 The effect on the decline in anger, which was measured by subtracting from Anger9/01 the factor scores of 
the corresponding January 2002 items, is significant at p<0.001. In addition, Anger9/01 is a significantly stronger 
predictor of the January 2002 measure of anger among those higher in Anti-Arab. For results, see Models 5 and 6 in 
Online Appendix Table A4. 
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Anti-Arab’s interactions with anger, fear, and threat do not appear to be spurious 
byproducts of ingroup identification, which sometimes correlates with prejudice.75  Ingroup 
identification should affect the emotions that people feel in response to their group’s successes 
and difficulties, rather than moderating the attitudinal effects of these emotions, the key result 
here.  Moreover, a January 2002 measure of ingroup pride in the data is only weakly correlated 
with Anti-Arab (r=0.13) and does not interact significantly with Anger9/01, Terror Worry, or 
Fear when substituted for Anti-Arab in the model used for Figure 2.76  
The Anger9/01 X Anti-Arab interaction is also unlikely to reflect mistaken retribution. 
The survey did not ask about Iraqi involvement in the terror attacks.  But misperceptions of Iraqi 
involvement in 9/11 would not have worsened views of all Arabs and Muslims, including Arab 
Americans, above and beyond the damage done by the widespread knowledge that 9/11 had been 
perpetrated by Arab and Muslim terrorists.  And if misperceptions of Iraqi complicity were 
inflated by an anger spillover effect, that would be broadly consistent with a vicarious retribution 
account.   
Anger at the Terrorists and Animosity toward the Arab–Muslim World 
We now turn to the question of whether public anger at the 9/11 perpetrators affected 
broader perceptions and feelings about Arabs and Muslims, which in turn aggravated support for 
war against Iraq.  As explained earlier, anger itself is likely to heighten perceptions of 
entitativity, resulting in greater blame and hostility toward the perpetrator’s outgroup and 
potential feedback effects.  Although unable to test these specific processes, we can test the 
                                                     
75 See Rui J. P. Jr. de Figueiredo and Zachary Elkins, "Are Patriots Bigots? An Inquiry into the Vices of in-
Group Pride," American Journal of Political Science 47, no. 1 (January 2003): 171–188; Herrmann, Isernia, and 
Segatti, "Attachment to the Nation"; Kinder and Kam, Us Against Them. 
76 The measure is built from post-9/11 feelings about “Americans as a whole,” “American political leaders,” 
“police,” and “fire fighters,” from the same series of items as Anti-Arab. 
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overall anger–outgroup hostility hypothesis by exploiting the fact that Anti-Arab measures 
worsened feelings about Arabs and Muslims as well as their perceived entitativity.  Anti-Arab 
correlates more strongly with anger than with fear, and thus appears to measure anger at Arabs 
and Muslims much more than fear of them.77  Whereas perceived entitativity should moderate 
the effects of Anger9/01 on Iraq War, anger at Arabs and Muslims would have at least partially 
mediated it.  Even unidimensional variables can function as both mediator and moderator in 
some circumstances.78  In this case, moreover, the variable reflects two constructs, one of which 
is largely a moderator and the other is largely a mediator.  
We begin by examining the relationship between Anger9/01 and Anti-Arab.  Figure 3 
plots coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from a regression of Anti-Arab on Anger9/01, 
controlling for Terror Worry, fear, ingroup pride, political ideology, right-wing authoritarianism 
(RWA), gender, race, income, and education.79 Anger9/01 strongly predicts Anti-Arab, with a 
10th-to-90th percentile increase in anger felt by otherwise-average citizens corresponding to 
feelings worsening about Arabs and Muslims from the median to the 65th percentile. This effect 
does not appear to have been due to anger’s common association with perceptions of strength 
                                                     
77 The correlations with the January 2002 emotion variables are r=0.43 vs. r=0.14 respectively, and there is a 
similar gap between Anti-Arab’s correlations with the September 2001 emotions; see Online Appendix Table A2.  
78 As Andrew Hayes observes, “there are many real-life processes in which things caused by X also influence 
the size of the effect of X on Y measured well after X. But M would have to be causally prior to Y in order for this 
to be possible, implying that M could also be construed as a mediator if M is caused in part by X but also influences 
Y in some fashion;” Introduction to Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional Process Analysis: A Regression-Based 
Approach (New York: Guilford Press, 2013), 399.  For an example in political science research, see Lilach Nir and 
James N. Druckman, "Campaign Mixed-Message Flows and Timing of Vote Decision," International Journal of 
Public Opinion Research 20, no. 3 (July 2008): 326–346.  
79 RWA is included because it often correlates with prejudice, intergroup anger, and support for war; Bob 
Altemeyer, "The Other ‘Authoritarian Personality’," Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 30 (1998): 47–92; 
Shana Levin, Felicia Pratto, Miriam Matthews, Jim Sidanius, and Nour Kteily, "A Dual Process Approach to 
Understanding Prejudice toward Americans in Lebanon: An Extension to Intergroup Threat Perceptions and 
Emotions," Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 16, no. 2 (2012): 139–158. Political ideology is measured with 
a seven-point liberal-conservative self-identification scale. Although the survey did not measure partisanship, data 
collected at other times from a sizable subgroup (N=127) revealed it to be uncorrelated with Anger 9/01 and Anti-
Arab, consistent with findings reported by Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese, "Distinct Political Effects"; Kalkan, 
Layman, and Uslaner, "Bands of Others." 
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and risk. Responses to a January 2002 item on how “strong” people felt regarding “the events of 
September 11,” when added to the model as another control variable, neither predicts Anti-Arab 
nor alters the estimated effect of Anger9/01.80 
 
[Figure 3 goes about here] 
 
Anti-Arab in turn strongly predicts war support, including the same controls. Figure 4 
plots the coefficients from two ordered probit models of Iraq War, a baseline model and another 
adding Anti-Arab as a predictor.  According the latter model, a 10th-to-90th percentile increase in 
Anti-Arab for otherwise average citizens increases the estimated probability of expressing “very 
much” support for war from 0.33 to 0.57.   
 
[Figure 4 goes about here]  
 
The data are also consistent with Anti-Arab partially mediating Anger9/01’s effect on 
Iraq War.  Controlling for Anti-Arab attenuates the estimated effect of Anger9/01, as can be seen 
from comparing the Anger9/01 coefficients across the two models.  For a more precise indirect-
effect estimate, we fit a path model with Iraq War and Anti-Arab assumed to be endogenous to 
Anger9/01 and the other control variables, and Iraq War also specified to be endogenous to Anti-
Arab.  The estimated indirect effect of Anger9/01 on Iraq War via Anti-Arab is equal to 34% of 
Anger9/01’s total effect.81  
These results are consistent with anger at the 9/11 perpetrators having increased support 
for war against Iraq in part by arousing a broad hostility toward Arabs and Muslims, including 
                                                     
80 See Model 2 of Online Appendix Table A4. 
81 This estimate is significant at p<0.0001 based on bootstrapped standard errors; see Online Appendix A5 for 
detailed results.  
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Arab Americans and others obviously uninvolved in 9/11.  Mediation tests do not establish 
causal direction among observed variables, but the fact that Anger9/01 was measured four 
months before Anti-Arab and Iraq War makes its estimated effect more likely to reflect an 
exogenous one.  In addition, the control variables included in the models minimize omitted 
variable bias to the extent possible with the available data.  
Might longstanding prejudices, rather than animosity aroused by the terror attacks, 
account for Anti-Arab’s correlations with Anger9/01 and Iraq War?  Although we lack a pre-9/11 
measure of anti-Arab/Muslim attitudes or any data on ethnocentrism to bring to bear on this 
question, there are three reasons for skepticism.  First, it seems unlikely that only ethnocentrists 
and those who already disliked Arabs and Muslims felt indignant over such a uniquely heinous 
and dramatic crime as the 9/11 attacks.  Second, if longstanding anti-Arab/Muslim prejudice 
accounted for Anti-Arab’s correlation with anger at the terrorists, then Anti-Arab should correlate 
just as strongly with anger measured at different points in time.  But Anti-Arab correlated more 
strongly with the January 2002 measure.82  Third, the questions used to measure Anti-Arab asked 
about specifically how feelings had changed due to 9/11.  Although it is possible that prejudiced 
individuals exaggerated such changes, it seems unlikely that Anti-Arab reflects only prior 
prejudice.   
The time frame of the data examined here, before the Bush Administration began selling 
war against Iraq, should limit the impact on our findings of heuristic cue taking from elite 
discourse.  But one can probe this possibility further by examining whether more educated 
citizens, who are generally more aware of political discourse, expressed feelings and attitudes 
                                                     
82 The correlations with Anger9/01 and January 2002 anger are r=0.29 and r=0.43 respectively; for additional 
bivariate correlations, see Online Appendix Table A2.  
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consistent with mainstream or polarized cue taking.83  If elites expressed anger, anti-Arab–
Muslim feeling, and war support, then these also would have been more widely echoed by 
politically aware citizens, whereas a divided elite would have generated ideological or partisan 
polarization among the politically aware.     
If elites did in fact provide one-sided messages of anger at the terrorists, hostility against 
Arabs and Muslims, and support for attacking Iraq, these were not reflected in Anger9/01, Anti-
Arab, or Iraq War.   As Figure 5 shows, education did not increase any of these key variables in 
the population at large.  In addition, more educated conservatives were not angrier, more hostile 
to Arabs and Muslims, or more belligerent toward Iraq than less educated ones, results that are 
problematic for a two-message, elite polarization effect. Conservatives did express greater war 
support and more negative feelings about Arabs and Muslims than did liberals, but these gaps 
were no greater among more educated citizens.  The only result consistent with two-sided 
heuristic cue taking is the lower level of anger over 9/11 expressed by educated liberals. 
[Figure 5 goes about here]  
 
Admittedly, the sensitivity of these tests is limited by using education as a proxy for 
political awareness and by the unusual intensity of post-9/11 media coverage and public 
attentiveness, which might have overcome the ordinary difference in political awareness 
associated with education.  But given the limited administration and media discourse on Iraq 
prior to the time when the second wave of the survey was fielded, it seems unlikely that the 
evidence for vicarious retribution revealed here resulted from public cue taking.   
                                                     
83 As does, for example, John R. Zaller, "Elite Leadership of Mass Opinion: New Evidence from the Gulf War," 
in Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War, ed. W. Lance Bennett and 
David L. Paletz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
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Additional evidence of the independence of Anger9/01 from Administration discourse 
can be seen from how little this variable changed in surveys completed before and after President 
Bush’s address to Congress on September 20th.  Bush identified the al Qaeda culprits and 
declared a “war on terrorism” for the first time in that widely watched speech, and he employed 
rhetoric that was tailor-made to arouse outrage.84  But as can be seen in Figure 6, public anger 
was not affected by the speech, and if anything was ebbing gradually over time.85  In theory, 
popular anger and desires for revenge already may have been shaped by Bush’s brief promise to 
bring the “evildoers” to “justice” on the evening of September 11.  But a study analyzing text 
messages sent over the course of that day found that public anger shot up dramatically in the 
daytime, before Bush gave his first brief remarks that evening.86 
 
 [Figure 6 goes about here]  
Discussion 
The findings presented here lend new support to the idea that shared Arab–Muslim 
identities channeled U.S. public outrage at the 9/11 perpetrators toward the Iraq regime.  Citizens 
who were relatively angry immediately following the terror attacks were relatively belligerent 
toward Iraq four months later, especially if they also viewed Arabs and Muslims as monolithic.  
This effect was compounded by worsened feelings about Arabs and Muslims in general.  
These results control for worry about the terror threat, partisanship, ideology, and 
demographics.  Although it would have been better to control for a more emotion-neutral 
measure of threat perception, controlling for worry about a threat is arguably better for isolating 
                                                     
84 Loseke, "Examining Emotion as Discourse.” 
85 A pre/post t-test reveals a decrease significant at p=0.07.   
86 Mitja D. Back, Albrecht C. P. Küfner, and Boris Egloff, "The Emotional Timeline of September 11, 2001," 
Psychological Science 21, no. 10 (October 2010): 1417–1419. 
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the effects of anger than is controlling only for fear or anxiety, as previous studies have done.87  
We lack data on perceptions of Iraqi complicity and dangerousness, and the costs and benefits of 
war, but none of these factors provide a satisfying explanation of our main findings.   
Cleaner measures of perceived Arab–Muslim entitativity, pre-9/11 measures of outgroup 
derogation and support for force, and data on beliefs Iraq’s connection to al Qaeda would have 
been useful for our analysis.  Nevertheless, the weight of evidence suggests that many U.S. 
citizens blamed Arabs and Muslims writ-large for 9/11 and favored attacking Iraq as a form of 
vicarious retribution. 
This helps to fill gaps in our understanding of how stereotyping and anger affected 
popular support for war against Iraq.  First, it appears that vicarious retribution accounts for at 
least some of the previously observed correlations between punitive predispositions, outrage over 
the terror attacks, and belligerence toward Iraq.88  Second, it helps explain the prior finding that 
many citizens who thought that Iraq had not been involved in 9/11 also said that attacking Iraq 
would help satisfy their desire to avenge 9/11.89  In principle, some citizens may have wanted to 
crush other “rogue states” besides Afghanistan to demonstrate U.S. toughness and bolster 
deterrence of other states contemplating support for anti-U.S. terrorism.90  But the role of 
feelings about Arabs and Muslims in war support, and the controls on worry about the terror 
threat, suggests that many Americans wanted to punish “the Arab–Muslim world” apart from 
seeking to bolster U.S. security.     
                                                     
87 Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese, "Distinct Political Effects"; Skitka et al., "Confrontational and Preventative 
Policy Responses." 
88 Liberman, "Eye for an Eye"; Skitka et al., "Confrontational and Preventative Policy Responses"; Huddy, 
Feldman, and Cassese, "Distinct Political Effects." 
89 Liberman and Skitka, "Revenge in US Public Support for War." 
90 Administration officials made this argument for war, but only behind closed doors, suggesting they did not 
believe it would be persuasive to the public; Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep inside America's 
Pursuit of Its Enemies (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 123–214; Barton Gellman, Angler: The Cheney Vice 
Presidency (New York: Penguin, 2008), 215–259.  
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Third, although we do not specifically examine ethnocentrism, our findings may help 
explain why, as Kinder and Kam put it, “the train of events that began on September 11 served to 
activate ethnocentrism among the American public.”91  Individuals who already saw identity 
groups in categorical terms would have been particularly likely to blame Arabs and Muslims 
writ-large for the actions of a small group of Arab and Muslim terrorists.   
Future research should try to provide more precise and discriminating tests of vicarious 
international retribution, to probe its underlying psychological mechanisms, and to investigate its 
moderators and boundary conditions.  Regarding mechanisms, it remains unclear whether angry 
citizens support vicarious retribution because they want to send a “don’t mess with me” message 
(a strategic motive), because they blame entire groups for the crimes of individual members (an 
intergroup analogue of the “prosecutorial mindset” spillover effect), or because it satisfied a felt 
need to punish at least a symbolic substitute for an elusive perpetrator.92  Given the potency of 
motivated reasoning in political attitudes, perhaps anger and a desire to lash out at symbolic 
stand-ins for the elusive Osama bin Laden accounts for some of the suspicions that Americans 
expressed about Iraqi complicity in 9/11.93 
                                                     
91 Kinder and Kam, Us Against Them, 99. Our findings are harder to reconcile with a prior finding that anti-
Muslim feelings did not predict support for war against Iraq in Fall 2004; Sides and Gross, "Stereotypes of 
Muslims."  The difference might be due to the different time periods studied, or the impact of feelings about Arabs 
and foreign Muslims, groups mentioned in our measure of outgroup hostility (Anti-Arab) but not in the measure 
used by Sides and Gross. 
92 Feelings that the Iraq War would satisfy or resolve a “need to prove that the US can’t be pushed around” 
correlated very highly with feelings that war would satisfy or resolve a “sense of moral outrage about the 9/11 
terrorist attacks,” “a desire to hurt those responsible,” and “a compelling need for vengeance,” but this does not 
establish a deterrent motive. See Liberman and Skitka, "Revenge in US Public Support for War,” 643 as well as 
Mario Gollwitzer, Linda J. Skitka, Daniel Wisneski, Arne Sjöström, Peter Liberman, Syed Javed Nazir, and Brad J. 
Bushman, “Vicarious Revenge and the Death of Osama bin Laden,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 40, 
no. 5 (May 2014), 604–616.  
93 Research on motivated reasoning in Iraq War attitudes, including on the question of Iraqi guilt, focused on the 
effects of partisanship rather than desires to avenge 9/11; see Brian J. Gaines, James H. Kuklinski, Paul J. Quirk, 
Buddy Peyton, and Jay Verkuilen, "Same Facts, Different Interpretations: Partisan Motivation and Opinion on Iraq," 
Journal of Politics 69, no. 4 (November 2007): 957–974; Monica Prasad, Andrew J. Perrin, Kieran Bezila, Steve G. 
Hoffman, Kate Kindleberger, Kim Manturuk, and Ashleigh Smith Powers, "'There Must Be a Reason:’ Osama, 
Saddam, and Inferred Justification," Sociological Inquiry 79, no. 2 (2009): 142–162. 
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Culture and the expected costs of war likely condition whether an injury to the nation 
arouses vicarious retribution.  Democracies possessing retributive cultures appear to be more 
war-prone because their leaders can whip up support for force more easily, by highlighting or 
exaggerating a target state’s aggressive or wrongful behavior.94  In addition, given popular 
sensitivity to U.S. casualties and the expected security benefits of force, vicarious retribution is 
likely to affect support for war most when its costs are expected to be low, ambiguous, or 
balanced by potential gains.  Vicarious retribution may have been unusually potent after 9/11, 
due not only to intense public anger, but also to U.S. military superiority over Iraq and public 
uncertainty about the consequences of regime change.  This combination of factors may have 
created a rare “perfect storm” of vicarious retribution.   
That said, it is easy to imagine terrorists once again managing to inflict a horrific attack 
on a powerful country, and again proving difficult to locate and punish.  In such circumstances, 
political leaders might be able to exploit popular vicarious retribution in order to win public 
consent for war against uninvolved targets.  In the case of post-9/11 United States, public 
belligerence toward Iraq diminished the political constraints on President Bush’s path to war.  If 
vicarious retribution continued to boost this belligerence in fall 2002, it would have added to the 
pressure on Congress to approve President Bush’s request, just before mid-term elections, to 
authorize war.95  Bush arguably would have been more reluctant to invade Iraq without that 
public and Congressional acquiescence.   
                                                     
94 Wolfgang Wagner and Michal Onderco, "Accommodation or Confrontation? Explaining Differences in 
Policies toward Iran," International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 4 (December 2014): 717–728; Rachel M. Stein, "War 
and Revenge: Explaining Conflict Initiation by Democracies," American Political Science Review 109, no. 3 
(August 2015): 556–573. 
95 Scott B. Blinder, "Going Public, Going to Baghdad: Presidential Agenda Setting and the Electoral Connection 
in Congress," in The Polarized Presidency of George W. Bush, ed. George C. Edwards, III and Desmond S. King 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).  For evidence that anger at the terrorists continued to correlate with 





Figure 1.  U.S. Public Feelings About 9/11, September 2001 and January 2002 
 









Figure 2 Note: Graphs show the predicted probability of strong agreement with “expanding the war on 
terror to Iraq” for citizens at the 10th and 90th percentiles of Anti-Arab.  Grey lines represent 95% 
confidence intervals, and X-axis labels mark 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of Anger9/01, Terror Worry, 





Figure 3. Predictors of Worsened Feelings About Arabs and Muslims 
 
 
Figure 3 Note: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the unstandardized coefficients in a 




Figure 4. Predictors of Support for Expanding War on Terror to Iraq 
 
Figure 4 Note: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the unstandardized coefficients from 





Figure 5. Effects of Education on Anger, Worsened Feelings About Arabs and Muslims, and Support for 
the Iraq War, among Liberals and Conservatives 
Figure 5 Note: HS = high school degree, BA = bachelor’s degree.  Based on Model 4 of Table A3 and 
Models 3 and 4 of Table A4 in the Online Appendix. 
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Figure 6. Anger Reported over Time, 14 September–2 October, 2001 
Figure 6 Note: Scatterplot of Anger9/01 (with y-axis labels marking the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of 
that variable) over survey–completion date, and locally smoothed mean. 
 
 
 
 
 
